DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 168 204 EA 011 492

AUTHOR Willower, Donald J.
TITLE Ideology and Science in Organization Theory.
PUB DATE Apr 79
NOTE 35p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Francisco, California, April 8-12, 1979)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Organizational Theories; *Personal Values; Sciences; *Scientific Methodology; *Social Science Research; Social Values; Theories

ABSTRACT

The author argues that particular theories tend to harmonize with certain values and beliefs and to clash with others. Further, theories may reflect the dominant values of a certain culture or a time, not to mention those of individual theorists or groups of theorists. In exploring the nonscientific side of certain theories, the author begins by examining alternative general orientations to the world. These orientations, or values, are often expressed in such dichotomies as the world is changing/the world is stable, and the world is characterized by unity/the world is characterized by diversity. The author examines how these orientations are included in three organizational theories--Marxism, phenomenology, and the garbage can model. He then questions the epistemological and scientific adequacy of the three approaches. The author deplores shifts from curiosity and detachment toward ideology, and argues that theories and research should be aimed at warranted explanations, not at the vindication of ideological commitments. (Author/IRT)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED168204

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN ORGANIZATION THEORY

by

Donald J. Willower

The Pennsylvania State University

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

D. J. Willower

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM."

Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, 1979. (Division A State of the Art Lecture.)

EA 011 492

10.22

IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN ORGANIZATION THEORY

by

Donald J. Willower

The origin of a theory, its statement, the evidence on a theory, and the attitudes of individuals and groups toward a theory can be distinguished for purposes of analysis. A theory might spring like Athena from the forehead of a modern Zeus with special insights, or it might be formulated in less dramatic fashion by several persons working in collaboration, perhaps as part of a large project. Even then, the birth of a theory, like other acts of creation, contains some elements of mystery.

The form in which a theory is stated can vary widely, particularly in terms of precision of expression, ranging from the formal elaboration characteristic of the physical sciences to the prose expositions common in the social sciences. If testable hypotheses are produced and not rejected after careful efforts to do so, confidence in a theory is increased, but no theory can be finally proved. However, a real problem, especially in the social sciences, is whether a theory has been disproved.

Difficulties like assuring representative cases and suitable operational definitions are such that the adequacy of a given test of theory is often questionable. Even if an empirical test is judged adequate, it can be argued that a theory should be assessed on the weight of evidence, not on a particular test. A theory that has not been clearly disproved might suffer loss of support and be replaced by new theory, but ordinarily not because a crucial experiment led to the choice.[1]

However, this does not mean that the rise and fall of theories is mere accident. Among other things, new theory might replace older theory because

it speaks to problems currently seen as important, or is more comprehensive or more elegant than its predecessors, or because a new methodology or new technology becomes available. Moreover, to say that theories ordinarily are not replaced as a result of crucial experiments is not the same as saying that evidence doesn't enter the picture. In spite of current psychologizing about theory, new theory is often accepted because favorable empirical evidence mounts up.

But the way in which theories come to be replaced by newer ones is a descriptive and historical issue. The question is "How do individuals and collectivities come to reject and accept theories?" This is not the same as asking whether a given theory is judged to satisfy canons of inquiry. An answer to the last question requires that a theory be assessed using standards that have come to be accepted as part of the normative processes of inquiry.

In any case, a theory's origin, and even its conceptual and empirical history might not tell us much about who will like the theory, who will feel comfortable with it, who will dislike it, who will feel uncomfortable with it, and what values it fits or offends. Such issues are a major concern of this paper. Particular theories tend to harmonize with certain values and beliefs and clash with others. Furthermore, theories may reflect the dominant values of a culture or a time, not to mention those of individual theorists or groups of theorists.

I use the term ideology in the present context to refer to attitudes, values and general orientations about man and the world. I do not use the term in the same political-historical sense that Mannheim did, nor do I insist that it refer to a whole system of orientations.[2] My purpose is simply to explore the non-scientific side of certain theories. But I am

also interested in implications for the scientific side that might result from such an exploration.

Alternative Orientations

I have selected a number of alternative general orientations to facilitate the analysis. They are similar to Pepper's "world hypotheses" or Gouldner's "background assumptions" and "domain assumptions,"[3] but they are actually time-honored themes. Some are virtually as old as serious thought about man and the world, and some were quite thoroughly developed during the dawning of philosophy in ancient Greece.

However, I make no special claims for the particular orientations chosen, other than that they were useful in the analysis. Others might deal with the same matters in different ways. Moreover, exploration of the fit between general orientations and particular theories is risky because of the wide array of possible orientations and because judgments concerning fit are necessarily imprecise.

Each orientation is stated in dichotomous terms. One is whether the world is essentially changing or stable. Is the world like the stream that Heraclitus could not stand in twice, or is change merely of appearances, while reality is static?

Another is whether the world is characterized by unity or diversity. This dichotomy is a version of the problem of the one and the many, and also is reflected in the monism-pluralism distinction in metaphysics.

Activism, the view that people should pursue the solution of social problems through direct intervention, as contrasted with passivism, the view that they should not, is a third dichotomy. Activism can be optimistic, holding that people can change the world, or pessimistic, holding that they

can have little effect on the world, but should fight the good fight anyway. Passivism can be optimistic, holding that social problems will solve themselves, pessimistic, holding that interventions are doomed to failure, or fatalistic, holding with Pope that "whatever is, is right."[4]

The next orientation is based on whether the world is seen in abstract or concrete terms, a dichotomy reminiscent of the realism-nominalism controversy. Obviously, all theories are abstract, but some are more abstract than others as past discussions of grand theories and middle range theories remind us. Somewhat like the abstract-concrete difference is that between reason and experience, in Dewey's terms between abstract reason and sensationalistic empiricism.[5]

Another division is that of nomothetic and idiographic science. These terms, originally applied in psychology by Wilhelm Windelband and given currency by Gordon W. Allport, have come to refer to the nomothetic search for general propositions as contrasted with the idiographic concern with the unique and singular.[6]

The last alternative orientation is whether man is seen as essentially rational or irrational. Aristotle defined man as a rational animal, but psychology makes a strong case against that definition. Even so, the alternatives are not without application.

The orientations were stated as dichotomies, but dichotomies tend to be simplistic. Particular theories might belong somewhere between the extremes represented by the alternatives, and some orientations might not fit at all.

The main point is that such orientations furnish special grounds for liking or disliking or valuing a theory. For some, they might even provide

personal reasons for belief in the truth or falsity of a theory independently of its scientific utility. At the same time, for others, a theory's ideological side might remain implicit or obscure and not be understood, or be understood and deemed unimportant. While some might view the alternative orientations as positions to be rationally or even empirically assessed, for present purposes, they should be seen in an attitudinal, valuational, ideological context.

Application of the orientations to particular theories furnishes the bulk of the analysis of ideology, but other ideological elements are occasionally noted. Three theories, Marxism, phenomenology and the garbage can model, will be examined. None have much of a history in the study of organizations, particularly in the study of school organizations. More familiar are such approaches as social system theory, bureaucratic theory, and various theories of leadership.

I selected the three theories because it seems likely that Marxism and especially the garbage can model will be more widely used in future inquiry on educational organizations, and because phenomenology has been an object of recent debate in educational administration. Furthermore, the ideology that fits these theories contrasts sharply with the ideology that fits some of the more traditional ones. An underlying set of issues concerns the interrelationships of ideology and science. Those are addressed after consideration of the theories.

Marxism

Marxism is both a theory of social change and a political movement. As such, it has had an important influence in intellectual history and in the practical affairs of people and nations.

As propounded by Marx and Engels and developed by Lenin, Marxism takes conflict, especially between social classes, as a central feature in the unfolding of history.[7] The struggle between the economically exploited working class and the exploiting capitalist class is to culminate in revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, which is to wither away, leaving a classless society.

Marxism incorporates a full fledged philosophy, dialectical materialism, which stresses the place of the dialectic in history and as a method. Because Hegel's dialectic was oriented toward idealism and that of Marx and Engels toward materialism and economic determinism, it has been said that Marx stood Hegel on his head.

Marxism has had its share of social scientists as well as philosophers. Gouldner has argued that sociology can be divided into two main camps, academic sociology represented primarily by American functionalism, and Marxism.[8] At the same time, Marxism has been criticized by sociologists from Weber to Sorokin to Parsons.[9] Among other things, critics charge that Marxism provides a simplistic, single force analysis of social change based on economic determinants, a charge long ago denied by Engels who asserted that he and Marx contended that economic forces were the ultimate, but not necessarily the sole determining elements in history.[10]

Given that Marxism is a broadly based conception, a macro-theory, what can be said about Marxist approaches to the study of organizations? Plainly, organization theory is an area in which Marxist thought has not been particularly active. The study of values is another such area, explained by some Marxist philosophers on the grounds that the Marxist emphasis has been on the realization of basic goods like health and economic security rather than

on the abstract elaboration of values.[11] Perhaps organization theory has received little attention for similar reasons. Marxist social scientists may have been more concerned with the examination of social ills than with the intracacies of organizational behavior. A simpler possibility is that Marxist analysis of organizations has been slow to develop because the applications of Marxist theory to organizations are not clear cut. Moreover, given the political character of Marxism, slow development might be expected in areas where a party line has not been distinctly set forth.

However, there have been some stirrings. One noteworthy contribution is Benson's which is explicitly devoted to the application of the Marxist perspective to organizations.[12] His analysis is divided into four general areas: the social production of organizational reality, the organization as a totality, organizational contradictions, and praxis. Each represents a principle of dialectical analysis. According to Benson, in dialectical analysis, organizations are considered to be in perpetual states of becoming. They have histories and "dialectical explanations observe or reconstruct sequences on the basis of historical evidence."[13] Their major structures and other features are products of social construction, a process that depends on the mediation of interests, authority, and power. Organizational authority is grounded in wider networks such as political-economic power blocs, and a key concern is the use of power to resist and overturn the official authority structure.

In dialectical analysis, organizations as totalities means an emphasis on the interpenetration of organizational parts, and on connections to the larger society and its economic and political systems. As I read it, totality in Marxism is not to be confused with the kind of holistic perspective found

in general systems theory. Marxists oppose such systems concepts, insisting on the primacy of the concrete over the abstract. Thus, "abstracting a 'formal structure' from the flux of ongoing social life is an unacceptable move for the dialectician."[14] Moreover, many such abstractions merely reflect administrator interests. The term organizational morphology is used to refer to an officially enforced and conventionally accepted view of an organization.

The basis of the overthrow of an organization's morphology lies in the organization's substructural network, relations linking organizational participants to each other and to the larger social world. According to Benson, linkages with social classes, racial, ethnic, and sexual groups, among others, can lead to morphological transformation. Such linkages, as well as those to dominant elements of society, illustrate the concept of organizational totality.

The general term contradiction designates breaks and inconsistencies in the social fabric of organizations. The notion that an organization is "a reasonably coherent, integrated system, rationally articulated or functionally adjusted . . . is an abstraction."[15] Contradictions are taken as an obvious feature of organizational life.

Internal contradictions grow out of clashing subunit perspectives, the operation of reward and control structures, and efforts to generate alternatives to current morphology. The larger society may be the source of contradictions as well, as when an organization is charged with inconsistent functions, or features of the economic-political system like labor-management conflict are mirrored in the organization. The most basic contradiction, the essence of social and political alienation is, according to Benson, the

organization as a reified thing standing over and against people. Those who recognize and act to overcome this contradiction are engaged in praxis, the creative reconstruction of social arrangements.

For the Marxist, current theories commonly are barriers to improvement. They are seen not only as theories, but as reflections of social context and of the concerns of their creators who are part of the reality they attempt to describe. Benson concedes that the principles of dialectical analysis do not constitute "a developed substantive theory of organizations nor a conceptual framework to guide research."[16] He states that they can guide the selection of research topics like the humanization of work, alternatives to bureaucracy, and the removal of dominance.

Benson's analysis clearly is consistent with the Marxist perspective. The emphasis on conflict and contradiction, on the larger economic-political context, and on changing the world by overthrowing exploitive elements are all there. Marx's concept of the alienation of the worker, one that can be applied directly to organizations, is also given a central place by Benson who depicts organizations as essentially oppressive and alienating.[17]

Benson cites, but deemphasizes the traditional dialectical principles such as the law of the strife, interpenetration and unity of opposities. However, this hardly dilutes the Marxian character of his analysis since these principles delimit broad, logical categories. More to the point is Benson's failure to set forth explicitly the "dialectical principles" represented by each of the areas he discussed.

In any case, Benson did not claim that he presented theory that could provide a conceptual basis for research. Yet, the rudiments of a theory are implicitly present, awaiting more explicit treatment. Such treatment is

essential if the Marxist approach to organizational analysis is to be more than a mixture of general perspective and polemics.

Given the current state of affairs, it is often hard to tell whether a particular study is guided by Marxist ideas.[18] Clues like quotations from Marx or the Bartlett's-like writings of Mao help, but Marxism has no monopoly on concepts like conflict or even on dialectical analysis. In spite of this kind of confusion, it seems likely that more Marxist oriented work on organizations is in the offing, perhaps in part because of the legacy of the sixties, a time when activism was king on the campuses and when many of today's younger scholars were students.

In education, Marxist approaches are no longer rare in areas like history and economics of education, and there is some work in the curriculum field.[19] Given Marxist studies of non-educational organizations and of selected areas of education, Marxist work on school organizations might well become more commonplace.

Marxism: Ideology

I turn now to ideology and the question of what kinds of attitudes, values and orientations fit the Marxist approach. A special problem with Marxism is that it is both a broad social theory and a political movement. Those who employ the theory usually are adherents of the political persuasion, and Marxist ideas in the social sciences tend to be intermixed with political doctrine.

In fact, Marxists view theories not as mere explanations, but as tools for social change. Hence, an ideological component of Marxism is the position that theories should be assessed on the basis of their social consequences,

not just on their scientific merit. A related orientation is activism. The Marxist view is that mankind's lot can be improved by active intervention, a view reflected in the concept of praxis. Marxian activism is optimistic, holding forth the vision of the inevitable achievement of the classless society.

Marxist theory portrays the world as changing rather than static, as the dialectic itself and the emphasis on contradiction and conflict in Marxism attest. Ordinarily, but not always, theories that stress change over stability also stress diversity over unity. While the fit is less clear cut than in the case of change and stability, Marxism falls more on the side of diversity. The concepts of contradiction and conflict suggest diversity as well as change, as does the clash of opposites in the dialectical process. Even the concept of totality does not imply unity as much as it does interpenetrations and linkages of discrete parts.

Moreover, possible arguments for a fit between Marxism and unity are thin. It could be contended that unity is implied by the encompassing character of economic determinants, or by the notion that eventually class struggles and presumably dialectical history end in a classless society. However, in regard to the former, Marxist doctrine holds that economic determinants spawn complex, non-economic "superstructures." Furthermore, even though economic determinants are taken as ultimately causal, there are different kinds of economic systems, and hence, diversity in the particular determinants and respective superstructures associated with them. The latter idea, a society without dialectical processes and lacking in contradictions is undeniably present in Marxism, but it is something of an anomaly,

inconsistent with other tenets of Marxian thought. On balance, Marxist theory tends to fit the general view that the world is characterized by diversity.

With regard to the abstract-concrete dichotomy, Marxists make a major point of the concreteness of their approach as contrasted with the abstractions found in other treatments. Abstractions are criticized not only when they go too far beyond description and "historical reality," but also because abstractions can abet oppression. Recall, for example, Benson's portrayal of formal organization as an abstraction reflecting current organizational morphology. For the Marxist, abstraction can lead to reification as when the state, or church, or an organization is taken as a thing dominant over people. Marxists have explicitly treated the question of the concrete and the abstract and they are committed to the concrete and critical of the abstract. Obviously, one can point to the dialectic, nothing less than a grand abstraction, and to the sweeping historical generalizations and utopian precepts in Marxism, and wonder about consistency. Nevertheless, from an ideological standpoint, it is important that Marxists believe that they stress the concrete and abjure the abstract. Marxism also favors experience over reason. However, for Marxists, experience is of the world and its practical activities, not introspective or subjectivistic.

Marxists are more likely to label man irrational than rational, but more fundamental is man as exploited or exploiter. Class consciousness and ideology, not reason, move mankind in Marxist thought.

The nomothetic-idiographic science distinction is problematic in its application. Concretism and the rejection of positivistic elements in science suggest an idiographic emphasis. However, Marxists consider themselves

objective and scientific. Even their political stance has been touted as scientific socialism. Essentially, they reject nomothetic science as it is usually defined, and substitute their own dialectical science.

Marxism is manifestly characterized by ideological orientations that favor change, the concrete, and its peculiar brand of "science," but its special ideological mark is its activism and commitment to a political creed, a creed that, in turn, is justified as "scientific."[20] Its appeal is to those who condemn current conditions, and are willing to affiliate with a movement that seeks to transform society. It seems likely that theoretical and empirical work by Marxist students of organizations will occur basically within the context of comprehensive Marxist doctrine.[21]

Phenomenology

The exploration of phenomenology is complicated by the use of the label by a very mixed congregation. Philosophical phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, is an effort to go beyond Kant and get at things-in-themselves by attending the immediately given.[22] Husserl's phenomenological method is subjectivistic. All presuppositions and judgments are suspended, leaving only the stream of pure experience of a given person which may have real or fictive data as its object.[23] For Husserl, the aim is the discovery of essences, not the examination of things.

Phenomenological approaches in the social sciences often have a vague connection to philosophical phenomenology. All sorts of direct and indirect antecedents are claimed. Husserl's name is sometimes evoked, but so are William James' concern with consciousness, G. H. Mead's symbolic interactionism and Max Weber's treatment of verstehen. In sociology, the work of Alfred

Schutz and his followers has many linkages to philosophical phenomenology, but much that is called phenomenological, such as the work of the ethnomethodologists, has few connections to the philosophy.[24] Some phenomenologically oriented psychologists explicitly eschew the philosophy. MacLeod, for example, states that "what we call psychological phenomenology is not to be confused with Husserl's philosophy."[25] Common to most psych logists in the phenomenological camp is the belief that consciousness can and should be studied, bringing to mind the wry comment that psychology first lost its soul, later its consciousness, and now seems in danger of losing its mind altogether.[26]

Perhaps the strongest bonds uniting phenomenologically oriented social scientists are their opposition to what they like to call positivistic science and its operationalism, quantitative emphasis, and behaviorism, along with a desire to come to grips with human experience.

In education, beyond the foundations areas, recent ferment in the curriculum field stems from criticisms having at least some phenomenological base, and educational administration has had the Griffiths-Greenfield debates.[27] Greenfield's version of phenomenology is bereft of any connection with philosophical phenomenology. It shares the bonds just noted and adds nominalism.

Applications to organizations are limited, but clearly increasing.[28] The studies that have been done stress perceptions, interpretations, and socially constructed reality, to use a term favored by both phenomenologists and Marxists. Most phenomenologically oriented researchers shun the detached observer role, attempting to adopt the perspectives of those studied.[29] The field study is a preferred medium.

Writing in December, 1978, I know of no genuinely phenomenological studies of school organizations. Greenfield tells us that much research

using subjectivistic assumptions has been done and "for those still unconvinced on this point" cites an article on "constructivist" approaches in educational research that, in turn, cites such familiar students of school organizations as Willard Waller, Dan C. Lortie, Philip Jackson, and Philip Cusick.[30] If I had to classify these scholars, I would say they employed a social system perspective. To label them phenomenologists or even subjectivists stretches definitions. Their work is field oriented, but that doesn't make it phenomenology. Recall that Griffiths was one of the earliest advocates of field studies of educational organizations, as well as one of the first to stress the importance of perception in school administration.[31] Indeed, terms like subjectivist, phenomenology and phenomenological have been applied variously and often loosely.

In part, the problem arises because phenomenological approaches to organizations, like Marxist ones, rely on a general perspective rather than developed theory. Hence, opportunities for obscurity abound, and theoretical explication is necessary if the phenomenological view is to contribute grounded explanations concerning educational organizations.

Phenomenology: Ideology

Use of the ideological orientations highlights differences between philosophical phenomenology and most phenomenological social science. Change and diversity are favored over stability and unity in phenomenological social science. The world is as diverse as those who construct it, and such constructed worlds change. Moreover, theories based on unifying systems concepts are rejected. Experience, not reason, is strongly emphasized. In fact, one author substitutes the term experientialism for phenomenology.[32] Experience

is concrete. Abstractions such as society are to be reduced to their "concrete social core."[33]

In the philosophy, experiencing as a phenomenological method is highly disciplined, and referents can be concrete or abstract. Since, for Husserl, the purpose of phenomenological analysis is the discovery of essences, the import of change, diversity, and sense experience is limited. Stability, unity, reason, and abstraction play a greater part in the philosophy than in the social science. Consistent with its pursuit of essences, Husserl's initial descriptive philosophy later became a philosophy of "transcendental phenomenological idealism."

Phenomenological social scientists reject nomothetic science because they see it as positivistic, and embrace idiographic science which legitimates their interest in individual experience. Their criticism of science and empathy for its human subjects is usually coupled with activism. Phenomenology and Marxism both are critical of the status quo, and several attempts have been made to blend the perspectives.[34]

Phenomenological social scientists are more muted on man's essential rationality or irrationality. Given their commitment to subjectivism, this is not surprising. Irrationality is a problem for any subjectivistic method, and social scientists are well acquainted with the limits of rationality.

The ideological pattern that fits phenomenological social science emphasizes concrete human experience and rejects the detached reason and theoretical abstraction of nomothetic science. It affirms an experienced, changing, diverse world and rejects a neatly packaged one. It stresses activitism because of its empathetic identification with the human condition and rejects a passive, neutral stance.

Similarities with Marxism are patent.[35] Shared ideological orientations help phenomenologists and Marxists gloss over important differences and become comfortable allies as critics of current social science, including inquiry on organizations.

The Garbage Can

Marxism and phenomenology are rooted in developed philosophical positions. The garbage can model is not. It is explicitly devoted to understanding decision processes in organizations, especially those called organized anarchies.[36] Such organizations are characterized by ill-defined, varied, even inconsistent preferences or goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation.

Within organized anarchies, choice situations can be viewed as garbage cans. Problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities are dumped into the garbage cans and mixed, but without any special orderliness. Solutions seek problems, participants move in and out of the action, and attention, time and energy are differentially expended, while events, structures, and past and present are loosely coupled. Solutions sometimes resolve problems, but sometimes are independent of them. Choices are made or put off within a shifting mix of problems, solutions and decision-makers.

Garbage can ideas have been used in a number of studies of organizations, mostly educational ones, which are thought to be organized anarchies. Included are educational organizations from the elementary school to the university level in Denmark, Norway and the United States.[37] The research method is primarily the case study, and the focus decision-making under the fluid, ambiguous conditions of garbage can imagery.

The kaleidoscopic, almost capricious character of decision-making is stressed in the studies. Efforts to bring order to such protean data vary, generalization being a problem for any framework that emphasizes diversity. Usually there is ordinary discussion using a few concepts, such as the allocation of attention. Sometimes, less tentative statements are made, as when a computer simulation reveals properties of garbage can decisions. On rare occasions propositions are presented; one set was on seeing and liking in organizations. Garbage can proponents see the approach as an antidote to rational models of organizations and decision processes. They believe that they deal with what actually happens rather than what should happen in organizations.

It seems likely that the garbage can framework will be used fairly extensively in the study of school organizations. Undoubtedly, the garbage can, organized anarchy, and loose coupling metaphors will gain wide currency, despite some trenchant criticisms.[38]

Garbage Can: Ideology

The garbage can approach emphasizes diversity and change. Its focus is on organizations and internal processes that feature those characteristics. Unity and stability are correspondingly deemphasized. Even the mood set by garbage can concepts like anarchy, ambiguity and foolishness clashes with unity, stability or other notions of system or order.

The concrete is stronger in the approach than the abstract, but not so strong as in Marxism, and experience is stronger than reason, but not so strong as in phenomenological social science. Interest in the unique and the use of case studies suggests tendencies to idiographic science, but that

is deceptive. Garbage can literature is critical of the focus and content of some theories, but it is not critical of quantitative science, nor of the search for general relationships.

People and organizations are seen as irrational in important respects, and rational models are rejected as unrealistic. This stance is unambiguous in the garbage can framework.

In contrast with the other approaches, this one is not oriented toward activism. Moreover, pessimism is expressed concerning reform, at least in organizations, because of what is seen as the realities of the situation. First priority is given to understanding rather than changing human circumstances.[39]

In sum, garbage can ideological orientations are strongest with regard to diversity, change and the irrationality of man, tilted toward the concrete and experience, accepting of both nomothetic and idiographic science, and not activist.

Ideology and the Times

All three of the frameworks seem destined to become more popular in inquiries on organizations. Their ideologies fit the times. The assassinations, Viet Nam, Watergate, inflation and ecological decline brought a special brand of melacholy to the universities, and dashed or dampened hopes that mankind could solve its most serious problems. A growing disenchantment with detached science and abstract theory was accompanied by activism, often radicalism, especially in social science faculties. Activism was partly a legacy of the now waned student revolts of the sixties and early seventies. It lives on in younger scholars who were part of that

generation, and in many not so young scholars who supported it. Its chief devil is "the system."

Rationality itself has been called into question as reasoning seemed to change little while conflict brought results. This was reenforced by changing societal standards that gave greater sway to feeling and emotion. Obscurantisms from the occult to existentialism gained new attention in popular culture, the arts, and the academy.

The ideological orientations of the three approaches blend well into such a landscape. All three emphasize diversity and change. They reject unity and stability, in effect, the system. All three come down on the side of the concrete and experience over the abstract and reason. Two stress man's essential irrationality. Two are critical of science as it is usually practiced and the third is critical of current theory. Two are strongly activist.

These ideological orientations stand in obvious contrast to those of more traditional theories such as social system, role, or bureaucratic theory where unity, stability, abstraction, reason and rationality are more salient. And the more traditional theories are part of current science which separates inquiry from activism.

Since the ideologies that fit Marxism, phenomenological social science, and the garbage can model fit the times, these perspectives appeal to those whose values are compatible with the ideologies and to those who are, as it were, children of the times. Perhaps the universities, thought to be cloistered centers of inquiry, mirror their environments more faithfully than believed. The social sciences, in which organization theories are grounded, may be barometers of changing ideological pressures. Applied

offshoots like educational administration might react more slowly, but theory and research in educational administration have been taking cues from the social sciences for some years now. We will be hearing much more of the three theories and others like them.[40] The ideological characters of these frameworks have provided clues as to the kinds of issues likely to arise in their use in inquiry, the topic considered next.

Science

First, I want to stake out the epistemological grounds undergirding my analysis. I hold that knowledge results from public procedures aimed at disproof. In other words, knowledge is the product of inquiry or science. Inquiry can yield warranted assertability, to use Dewey's term, but not final truth.[41] Knowledge is not based on authority, faith, or intuition, and it is neither transcendent nor absolute. Knowledge is temporary and inquiry is self correcting.

Science cannot be equated with positivism, used as a straw man by phenomenologists, Marxists, and others who picture science as mechanistic and inhumane. Actually, logical positivism has contributed much to science through efforts to clarify language and procedures. Its emphasis on operational definitions has been especially helpful in the social sciences. However, positivism is too narrow to capture what inquiry is about, particularly the creative aspects of inquiry.

Inquiry has two sides, the creative and the critical.[42] The creative side has to do with curiosity, conjecture and the invention of concepts, ideas and explanations. The critical side has to do with scepticism, doubt and the process of verification, or to use Popper's more apt term, falsification, the effort to disprove hypotheses.[43] The creative side of inquiry

is grounded in the desire to explain, and nurtured by imagination. It is loose, with little structure, and it can be very private. The critical side is more structured, aimed at refutation, and its procedures must be public.

Critics of mechanistic science stint the creative side of inquiry. Critics of science as mere ideology stint its critical side. However, one can raise legitimate questions about detachment in science because of human irrationality, vulnerability to social pressure, and need for emotional commitment, and still honor the critical side of inquiry. Mitroff describes the jealousies, politicing, and lack of emotional neutrality on the part of moon rock scientists, but makes it clear that he "does not wish to be labeled as an advocate of a subjectivist or irrational interpretation of science."[44] Polanyi extols the subjective in his treatment of passion, commitment, and personal judgment in science, but retains the objective by defining verification in terms of competent personal judgment.[45] Gouldner demonstrates the significance of context and ideology for social theory, but takes pains to separate the verification of theory from its social and ideological webs.[46]

The very fact that all of us are subject to all sorts of biasing underscores the importance of controlling and reducing bias in inquiry's critical phase. Even though norms for detachment and disproof cannot be perfectly applied and are sometimes seriously violated, they help guarantee the integrity of inquiry.

Advocacy in Marxism and phenomenological social science stands in stark contrast to such norms. Marxism is received doctrine. In terms of the sociology of knowledge, which Marxism applies to others but rarely itself, the doctrine's role in international political struggles clearly is related

to the disciplined conformity that marks its social science applications. There are a few independent Marxists. Marx himself remarked that, "All I know is that I am not a Marxist."[47] But essentially Marxism is dogma, with more of the qualities of a religion than a theory. While not so thoroughly doctrinaire, phenomenological social scientists also see their position as one to be upheld rather than tested. The conceptual state of these approaches abets this. Although I used the term, neither Marxism nor phenomenology is genuine theory in the sense of propositions leading to testable hypotheses. This theoretical immaturity allows ideology, not inquiry, to be paramount in both views. In contrast, the garbage can model is not a credo, although some writing has that breathless tidings quality so characteristic of that on general systems theory, the garbage can's ideological opposite.[48]

The argument that detachment and disproof take the humanity out of science is nonsense. The creative side of inquiry remains, and one can be an advocate of inquiry itself, as in the old saw about an irrational passion for dispassionate rationalism. In any case, the conclusions of sceptics seem more dependable than those of advocates. Moreover, the humanity of scientists endures. They can advocate anything they choose, but as people, not as scientists.

Marxism and phenomenology have their full share of true believers, to use Eric Hoffer's term. True belief, taken at its own level, suggests an epistemology based on faith in some higher wisdom. As far as formal epistemology in Marxism is concerned, Somerville tells us that "not a very great deal of work has been done in this field . . . ."[49] A materialistic metaphysics and dialectical analysis are epistemologically relevant, but how knowledge is sought and verified remains undeveloped. Phenomenology,

in its philosophic form, has an extensive epistemology that ends in idealism, introspective intuition, and a major embarrassment with regard to inter-subjectivity. Phenomenology flirts with solipsism, a view that Marxists believe should be 'laughed out of court."[50] Phenomenological social scientists have been less concerned with epistemological questions, but they share the inter-subjectivity difficult with the philosophy. Whether the epistemological exposure of Marxism and phenomenological social science would reduce the legions of true believers is unknown. However, at the least, critics of inquiry as a path to knowledge should explicitly lay out their alternative paths, if they have them.

Critics of science including Marxists and phenomenological social scientists sometimes do not understand it as process or, ironically, its limits. Arguments are made that, because detachment is difficult, only subjectivism is possible; because theory is likely to fit some ideology, theory is mere ideology; because the results of science are never final, nothing is known.[51]

One is left to speculate about the future of Marxist and phenomenological research on organizations. It seems likely that many in both camps will continue to press their ideological and critical views, perhaps without doing much research. Some might separate ideology and science, and having stated or been silent about their general perspectives, simply do studies on relevant topics like conflict or social perception. The field study might well be a favored method.

Whether more explicit theory will be developed from either perspective is an open question. Admitedly, I wonder if the Marxists can get far beyond their ideology and polemics, and I am not sure that phenomenological

research at its best will be much more than social psychology with a mission. However, in the final analysis, a pragmatic criterion should be applied. Judgments on the utility of these conceptions for inquiry should be based on the quality of the future theory and research they produce.

Since the topic is science, only a brief comment is made about the activism of Marxists and some phenomenological social scientists. To present a particular moral position as a scientist and as part of a supposedly scientific perspective is a form of arrogance and elitism. Science can abet deliberate moral choice when knowledge is available on the likelihood that certain values will be realized through specific choices, a far cry from the imposition of a predetermined moral viewpoint.

In contrast with the previous frameworks, the garbage can model has shown considerable utility in empirical studies. Even so, it seems fated to be a fad in some circles because of the cuteness of its concepts and analogies.

Its straw man is rationality. Its proponents see a vast, naive literature holding that rationality describes what actually goes on in organizations. This is a familiar theme, the opening of hosts of articles on some aspect of irrationality in organizations. Yet even bureaucracy was depicted by Weber as an ideal type not necessarily found in experience, and later work on bureaucracy deals primarily with its dysfunctions.[52] Much of the literature on authority and control assumes rationality as a goal, but not as a description of organizational life. Thus, the garbage can is not as sharp a break with the past as some hold. Even the concept of loose coupling is quite similar to Bidwell's structural looseness, presented fourteen years ago.[53]

In any case, along with others, I am not convinced the garbage can model depicts organizational life as it is.[54] Public schools seem to me to be more organized than anarchic. Elements that make for anarchy like vulnerability to public intervention, unselected clients, high population density, role overload, logistical problems, vague goals and effectiveness criteria, and lack of a work technology are countered by a wide range of formal and normative structures that reduce variation, and promote the routinization so characteristic of school life.[55] Garbage can preoccupation with the critique of rationality, and vivid portrayal of the anarchical deemphasizes the interplay of organizing and anarchic forces. This interplay a key to understanding organizations, helps participants adjust to and sometimes enjoy organizational life while the activities of the organization are conducted at levels reasonably consistent with societal expectations. In any case, garbage can issues tend to be open to empirical scrutiny, something less true of the other two approaches.

While I have been critical of the approaches, I welcome counter arguments. Perhaps we can all find some humor in the words attributed by reporters to the late Mayor Richard Daley: "They have vilified me. They have crucified me. Yes, they have even criticized me."

Concluding Comments

This has not been a typical state of the art lecture. Instead of commenting on where we are in educational administration, I chose to say something about emerging issues.[56] One such issue is the place of ideology in organization theory, and another is the relationship of ideology and science.

I selected for analysis three theoretical perspectives that seem likely to become more widely used in work on educational organizations and showed

how they fitted certain ideological patterns, patterns in keeping with the times. Then I raised questions about the epistemological and scientific adequacy of the perspectives.

Both the creative and critical sides of science were stressed because I believe that proper inquiry blends the freewheeling creation of ideas with critical efforts to disprove those same ideas. I deplore shifts in our field from curiosity and detachment toward ideology. Our theories and research should be aimed at warranted explanations, not at the vindication of ideological commitments. Must one be a phenomenologist or systems theorist or whatever? Shouldn't individuals use whatever theories speak to the problems that interest them, if they can do so competently?

We have come a long way since Woodrow Wilson wrote about the study of administration more than 90 years ago.[57] It would be foolish to heed the Cassandras who tell us that inquiry comes to nothing and who would replace it with ideology, in particular, their own.

Inquiry not only serves knowledge, but it can also inform thoughtful administrative practice and assist the implementation of values in practice.[58] Ferment in the ideological realm should not divert those of us who are interested in the study of educational organizations from our main task--the free search for ideas, and their critical examination.

FOOTNOTES

1. Often cited on this topic is Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2d ed., 1970. This work appears to enjoy greater uncritical acceptance in the literature of educational administration than it does in some other areas.

2. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936.

3. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1942; Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

4. Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle I, line 294.

5. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt, 1938, p. 515.

6. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte and Naturwissenschaft. (Rectorial address at Strasbourg, 1894) Strasbourg: Heitz and Mundel, 1904; Gordon W. Allport, The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science. New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 49, 1942.

7. See, among other works, Karl Marx, Capital, ed. Friederich Engels, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. London: William Glaisher, 1918; Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, The Communist Manifesto and The German Ideology, both New York: International Publishers, 1930 and 1947 respectively; and V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, trans. David Kvitko. Collected works of V. I. Lenin, Vol. 13. New York: International Publishers, 1927.

8. Gouldner, op. cit. The work is, of course, essentially Marxist in orientation.

9. See "Marx and Weber," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 46 ff.; Pitirim A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York: Harper and Row, 1928; Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966. Parsons' critique is based on the economics as sole determinant issue, Sorokin's is broad and quite acerbic, while Weber's views are in agreement with those of Marx on a number of points, but are in essential disagreement with Marx's treatment of social history.

10. Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, Correspondence 1846-1895, ed. and trans. Dona Torr. New York: International Publishers, 1936, Engels to J. Bloch, p. 475.

11. John Somerville, "Dialectical Materialism" in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947.

12. J. Kenneth Benson, "Organizations: A Dialectical View," Administrative Science Quarterly, 22 (March, 1977); See also Benson's larger work Organizational Analysis: Critique and Innovation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977.

13. Benson, "Organizations: A Dialectical View," op. cit., p. 7.

14. Ibid., p. 9.

15. Ibid., p. 14.

16. Ibid., p. 19.

17. On the concept of alienation in Marx, see Auguste Cornu, "Hegel, Marx, and Engels," in Philosophy for the Future, ed. R. W. Sellars, V. J. McGill and Marvin Farber. New York: Macmillan, 1949.

18. Two examples of this are Susan V. Lourenco and John C. Glidewell, "A Dialectical Analysis of Organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly, 20 (December, 1975); and Nicole W. Biggart, "The Creative-Destructive Process of Organizational Change: The Case of the Post Office," Administrative Science Quarterly, 22 (September, 1977).

19. See, for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. New York: Basic Books, 1976; and Elizabeth Cagan, "Individualism, Collectivism, and Radical Educational Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 48 (May, 1978). Our statements about Marxist oriented work on organizations and in education particularly apply to American work. Marxist approaches are more common in many other parts of the world. There are, of course, many general treatments of the implications of Marxism for education.

20. This point is made by Polanyi in his forceful criticism of Marxism. See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, especially pp. 227-245.

21. Orthodoxy spawns its own criteria of criticism, and sometimes, contests in purity. Thus, the Marxist reviewer of a new Marxist oriented book on organizations is generally positive, but critical when he finds instances of such things as ". . . theoretical revisionism, if not deformation of Marxian ideas . . . ." See Wolf Heydebrand, Review of Critical Issues in Organizations, ed. Stewart Clegg and David Dunkerley. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23 (December, 1978), p. 644.

22. Two translated works are Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Macmillan, 1931; and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970. The best basic work on phenomenology by an American is Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943.

23. Comments on phenomenological method can be found in Marvin Farber's "Phenomenology" in Runes, op. cit.; and "Experience and Subjectivism" in Sellars, McGill and Farber, op. cit.

24. See Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967; and Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967.

25. R. B. MacLeod, "Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology," in Behaviorism and Phenomenology, ed. T. W. Wann. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 51.

26. Noted in Herbert Feigl, "Philosophical Embarrassments of Psychology," The American Psychologist, 14 (March, 1959), p. 121.

27. On curriculum see William F. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978," Educational Researcher, 7 (September, 1978). Citations on the debate can be found in T. B. Greenfield, "Reflections on Organization Theory and the Truths of Irreconcilable Realities," Educational Administration Quarterly, 14 (Spring, 1978).

28. A study that appears in an excellent general work on phenomenology and social science is Roger Jehenson, "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Formal Organization," in Phenomenological Sociology, ed. George Psathas. New York: Wiley, 1973.

29. An obvious strategy is to study one's own experience. See R. P. Gephart, Jr., "Status Degradation and Organizational Succession: An Ethnomethodological Approach," Administrative Science Quarterly, 23 (December, 1978). On the broad issue of social construction see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.

30. Greenfield, op. cit. cites A. Jon Magoon, "Constructivist Approaches in Educational Research," Review of Educational Research, 47 (Fall, 1977).

31. On observational studies see Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959, p. 35; on perception, Human Relations in School Administration. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956, chap. 3. Many later writers, myself included, have also advocated field methods to study educational organizations.

32, Sigmond Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unity," in Wann, op. cit.

33. Helmut R. Wagner, "The Scope of Phenomenological Sociology: Considerations and Suggestions," in Psathas, op. cit., p. 67.

34. Lacking the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of a classless society, phenomenological activism need not be optimistic. Blendings of the two views are considered in Fred R. Dallmayr, "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in Psathas, op. cit.; and John O'Neill, Sociology as a Skin Trade. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

35. Existentialism, of course, has much in common with phenomenology, and some things with Marxism. However, those matters are outside the scope of the present paper.

36. The main sources are Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (March, 1972); Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974; and James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen-Oslo-Tromso, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976. On loose coupling see Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administrative Science Quarterly, 21 (March, 1976).

37. March and Olsen, op. cit.

38. Larry D. Spence, Yoshimitsu Takei and Francis M. Sim, "Conceptualizing Loose Coupling: Believing is Seeing or the Garbage Can as Myth and Ceremony." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 1978, is highly critical of the garbage can approach and especially of the loose coupling concept. A paper that rejects the idea of organized anarchies is John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American Journal of Sociology, 83 (September, 1977).

39. See especially Michael D. Cohen, "Reply to Argyris," Administrative Science Quarterly, 21 (September, 1976).

40. Contingency theory has some garbage can elements, but is closer to social system theory. Even so, contingency theorists, like their garbage can counterparts, feel their work constitutes a major break with the past. In educational administration, see E. Mark Hanson and Michael E. Brown, "A Contingency View of Problem Solving in Schools: A Case Analyses," Educational Administration Quarterly, 13 (Spring, 1977); and Hanson's "Organizational Control in Educational Systems." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Toronto, 1978.

41. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt, 1938.

42. For some years I have argued that these two sides of inquiry joined in individuals as the reflective temper should be a mark of both students of organizations and practitioners of administration. See "The Professorship in Educational Administration: A Rationale," in The Professorship in Educational Administration, ed. D. J. Willower and J. A. Culbertson. Columbus, OH and University Park, PA: University Council for Educational Administration and The Pennsylvania State University, 1964.

43. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, 1959.

44. Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science. New York: Elsevier, 1974, p. 100.

45. Polanyi, op. cit.

46. Gouldner, op. cit., especially pp. 13, 488.

47. Marx and Engels, Correspondence, op. cit. Marx is quoted by Engels in Engels to Conrad Schmidt, p. 472.

48. For a critique see Robert Lillienfeld, The Rise of Systems Theory: An Ideological Analysis. New York: Wiley, 1978.

49. Somerville, op. cit., pp. 486-487.

50. Ibid., p. 487.

51. Greenfield, op. cit., uses arguments of this sort.

52. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949; Charles H. Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face," Social Forces, 25 (October, 1946); Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968.

53. Charles E. Bidwell, "The School as a Formal Organization," in The Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965. The loose coupling concept is taken from Robert B. Glassman, "Persistence and Loose Coupling in Living Systems," Behavioral Science, 18 (March, 1973); and George J. Klir, An Approach to General Systems Theory. New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold, 1969.

54. See note 38.

55. D. J. Willower, "Social Control in Schools," in Encyclopedia of Education, ed. Lee C. Deighton. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1971, Vol. 8.

56. Recent assessments of the state of the art by Glenn L. Immegart, Andrew W. Halpin and Andrew E. Hayes, and W. W. Charters, Jr. can be found in Educational Administration: The Developing Decades, ed. Luvern L. Cunningham, Walter G. Hack and Raphael O. Nystrand. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1977. My views are given in "Theory in Educational Administration," Journal of Educational Administration, 13 (May, 1975); and "Some Issues in Research on School Organizations," in Currents in Administrative Research: Problem Finding in Education, ed. Glenn L. Immegart and William L. Boyd. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, forthcoming.

57. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, 2 (June, 1887).

58. I continue to see values as crucial in educational administration, and argue that valuation and inquiry should be interrelated in administrative practice. See, "The professorship . . . ," op. cit.; and "Schools, Values and Educational Inquiry," Educational Administration Quarterly, 9 (Spring, 1973).